The Sky’s the Limit: Twenty-First Century Searches of Hard-Drives, Smartphone Applications the Cloud by Hochhalter, Quinn
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 90 Number 1 Article 6 
1-1-2014 
The Sky’s the Limit: Twenty-First Century Searches of Hard-Drives, 
Smartphone Applications the Cloud 
Quinn Hochhalter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hochhalter, Quinn (2014) "The Sky’s the Limit: Twenty-First Century Searches of Hard-Drives, Smartphone 
Applications the Cloud," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 90 : No. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol90/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
        
 
THE SKY’S THE LIMIT:  TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
SEARCHES OF HARD-DRIVES, SMARTPHONE 
APPLICATIONS, & THE CLOUD 
ABSTRACT 
 
Now more than ever, computers and smartphones are used to store 
much of our personal information.  It is no coincidence that these devices 
are being increasingly used in criminal investigations.  This Note reviews 
current trends in the searches of electronically stored information, considers 
alternative proposals, and reviews current Supreme Court speculation.  
Specifically, this Note looks at the differences in search protocol depending 
on where digital information is stored: either on-site, such as a hard-drive or 
disk, or off-site, such as a smartphone application or in the cloud.  
Understanding where and how virtual information is stored will help to 
ensure the legal community makes informed decisions as it continues to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The alarm on your cellphone rings.  It’s 7:00 a.m.  Time to get up and 
get ready for work.  Before you leave the house, you check your personal 
email.  You check your work email.  You check your phone’s text 
messages.  You record your jog in your smartphone’s fitness application.1  
It only takes a second.  Your smartphone remembers you.  Your 
smartphone remembers all of your account information, no passwords 
necessary.  On your way to work you access your music downloads and call 
a nearby dentist to schedule an appointment.  When you arrive at work you 
 
1.  “A mobile application is a piece of software that is contained within a phone for a 
particular purpose or use . . . Essentially, the main goal for all mobile applications is to provide a 
service that can be used on cell phones rather than an actual computer.”  Alex Krouse, iPads, 
iPhones, Androids, and Smartphones: FDA Regulation of Mobile Phone Applications as Medical 
Devices, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 731, 732 (2012). 
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take a picture of the early morning sunrise and upload it to Instagram,2 
complete with the time of day and your geographic location.3  In the 
elevator, you read reviews of new lunch spots in the neighborhood.  Google 
predicts your search based4 on your previous searches and you passingly 
acknowledge that the advertisements in the margins are tailored to items 
you have recently searched or purchased online.5  Just as you are about to 
sit down at your desk and get to work, you fire off a last minute reply 
message to a Facebook friend. 
Our phones and our laptops know more about us than ever before.  
Each year, technology is greatly improving the ease and speed with which 
we document and record our daily lives.6  In fact, because of the ease and 
convenience with which it can now be done, it may be that people record 
and keep information that they otherwise would not have kept.7  The only 
real limit on the amount of information stored used to be based upon the 
device’s storage capacity, but now with the introduction of remote storage 
locations, like Apple’s iCloud,8 the virtual sky is the limit.  Aware that 
more and more personal information is stored with their products, many 
electronic manufacturers offer password protection9 for their devices, which 
users may or may not choose to use.  Security features such as numerical 
 
2.  Instagram is a photo-sharing service owned by Facebook. 
3.  Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, www.instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/#section1 (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2014): 
Users can add or may have Metadata added to their User Content . . . This makes . . .  
User Content more searchable by others and more interactive [and] your latitude and 
longitude will be stored with the photo and searchable . . .if your photo is made public 
by you in accordance with your privacy settings. 
4.  Google completes searches and URLs typed into Google Chrome’s address bar similar to 
autofill in web forms.  Google Chrome Privacy Notice, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/ 
enUS/chrome/browser/privacy/ (last visited February 21, 2014).  
5.  Google collects information from its user’s browsing activity and uses the information to 
provide custom advertisements.  Ad Targeting:  About Internet Based Advertising, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/113771?hl=en (last visited February 21, 2014).   
6.  Fifty-seven percent of American Adults use their cell phone to go online.  Twenty-one 
percent of cell phone owners say they mostly access the internet using their phone.  Maeve 
Duggan & Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use 2013, PEW RESEARCH (Sept. 16, 2013), 
www.pewinternet.org/topics/Mobile.aspx?typeFiler=5.  
7.  Google’s Gmail users with empty trash folders used to receive messages such as:  “No 
conversations in the trash.  Who needs to delete when you have 1000 MB of storage?!”.  See Ari 
Schwartz, Deirdre Mulligan & Indrani Mondal, Storing Our Lives Online:  Expanded E-mail 
Storage Raises Complex Policy Issues, 1 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO SOC’Y 597, 601 n.7 (2005). 
8.  “iCloud lets you access your music, photos, documents, and more from whatever device 
you’re on . . . iCloud puts your content on all your devices.” iCloud, APPLE 
www.apple.com/icloud (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).  
9.  Typical passwords for mobile devices are numerical or picture drawing sequences.  
Recently, Apple released a new iPhone which is fingerprint protected.  On the iPhone 5s, the 
Touch ID sensor quickly reads your fingerprint and unlocks your phone.  Iphone 5s, APPLE, 
www.apple.com/iphone-5s/features/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2014). 
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passwords have long been used to hide your device’s contents from prying 
eyes in the event that it becomes lost or is stolen.  As long as your 
smartphone is password protected, you do not have to fear that someone 
will find out just how many photographs of those venti, soy lattes you have 
been taking. 
Most smartphones, though, contain more than just pictures of 
artistically designed latte foam.  As alluded to earlier, a smartphone is often 
used for a lot more than just its camera.  Any one smartphone or laptop 
device may contain hundreds of pictures, emails, documents, and other 
digital information on its own hard drive.  Many devices also have access to 
many more files that can be located or saved remotely.  The amount of 
information that is accessed through each of these devices makes recording 
and documenting our lives easier and, not coincidentally, makes fighting 
crime easier as well.  With regards to criminal activity, a computer can be 
used to store illegal contraband, such as child pornography, evidence of 
criminal activity, such as a record of illegal transactions or fraud, or as the 
instrument of a crime. 
Although it is now common for investigators to search and seize 
electronic devices, questions about what is reasonable or what is fair still 
remain.  Rapid advances in the way technology can record, save, and 
duplicate mass quantities of information may prove difficult to deal with for 
a profession that prefers to act only where there is precedent.  Until the 
Supreme Court addresses this issue directly, the current trend has been to 
apply established search and seizure law to searches of electronic devices.  
Using doctrines intended for limited physical spaces, possessions, and time 
frames, however, is cause for concern where they are applied to such huge 
quantities of information contained in virtually limitless boundaries. 
In order to aid North Dakota’s legal community in making informed 
decisions while developing this area of law, this Note provides an overview 
of how electronic information is being stored, how the law is currently 
being applied to these technologies at both the state and federal levels, and 
alternative proposals that have been made in anticipation of future Supreme 
Court review.  It is my hope that a better understanding of how electronic 
information is being stored, combined with the lawyer’s understanding of 
how this information is typically used by lay citizens and criminal 
investigators, will lead to tailored, fair, and just laws consistent with the 
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.10 
 
10.  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
         
2014] NOTE 175 
II. ELECTRONIC STORAGE 
The amount of information that can be stored electronically is really 
astonishing.  If you are shopping for a new laptop, you will find that most 
devices offer 100 to 300 gigabytes (GB) of storage space on their hard 
drives.  To give you an idea of how much information that is, a LexisNexis 
chart indicates that a single GB is equivalent to approximately 64,782 pages 
of Microsoft Word files.11  Any items saved to the laptop will be located in 
the hard drive; this does not include email.  These days, email is typically 
held in third-party storage.  For example, Google offers its Gmail users 
fifteen GB of free, internet-based storage with each email account.12  
Fifteen GB of storage is fifteen times what Google offered Gmail users ten 
years ago.13  Additional storage, should you need it, is easy to come by.  
External hard drives (often offering one or two terabytes of storage),14 
thumb drives, compact discs (CDs), and third party or web-based, cloud 
storage are relatively inexpensive ways to dramatically increase electronic 
storage capacity. 
Since electronic storage is often out of sight, it often stays out of mind.  
Anyone storing hundreds of thousands, or even tens of thousands of 
documents in their home office would likely draw some criticism from their 
housemates.  That is not the case if the documents are stored electronically.  
When we are not forced to organize and find spots for physical files, we no 
longer need to be concerned with exactly where they are located.  For 
example, those of us using Apple’s Macbook know that our pictures and 
videos are saved in iPhoto, our music is saved in iTunes, and our emails are 
in Messages, but knowing where to click and knowing where a file is saved 
are not the same.  Many people may not realize that while some of their 
files are being saved locally, directly to their computers or on-site, others 
are being kept remotely, online on a third-party server or off-site. 
A. ON-SITE STORAGE 
I will refer to the files saved to a computer or other closed container as 
on-site, meaning the information’s source is kept locally, inside the device.  
 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
11.  How Many Pages in a Gigabyte?, LEXIS NEXIS 1, 1 (2014), www.lexisnexis.com/ 
applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitepapers/adifspagesinagigabyte.pdf.  
12.  Google Drive, GOOGLE, www.google.com/drive (last visited Jan. 4, 2014).  
13.  See Schwartz et al., supra note 7, at 600. 
14.  A terabyte is a measure of storage capacity equal to 1,000 GB.  The prefix “tera” is 
Greek for “monster.”  Tera, MERRIAM WEBSTER, www mirriam-webster.com/dictionary/tera (last 
visited Jan. 4. 2014).   
         
176 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:171 
For example, files saved to external hard-drives or thumb drives store 
information locally.  Information kept on these storage devices is typically 
owned or used exclusively by one individual, though that individual is 
likely to have no idea how the information is being recorded.  While they 
come in many different forms, computers storage devices operate similarly.  
Specifically, the hard drive stores information in various eight-character 
strings of zeroes and ones.15  As one commentator explains: 
The hard drive itself consists of several magnetized metal platters, 
something like magnetized compact discs that contain millions or 
even billions of tiny magnetized points placed in concentric circles 
like the growth rings of a very old tree.  The magnetized points can 
be left either in a magnetized state, which represents “1,” or a 
demagnetized state, which represents “0.”  Whenever a user enters 
a command that requires the computer to access data stored on the 
hard drive or write data onto the hard drive, the platters spin and 
the magnetic heads are directed over that portion of the hard drive 
where the particular information is stored.  As the magnetic heads 
pass over the magnetized points on the platters, they generate an 
electrical current.  That current is the signal representing the zeros 
and ones and can be inputted into the computer processor or 
outputted from it.16 
Searching on-site information is perhaps more similar to traditional 
physical searches of a home than off-site information because the on-site 
files are actually located within a contained space to be searched.  It is clear, 
however, that even on-site files are much more complicated and vast than 
anything that could be physically contained in a house.  When we try to 
decide what it means to search and seize this type of information, it may be 
important to consider just how different the physical and the electronic 
realms are.  Only the device’s user, as opposed to the general public, 
typically accesses on-site files, but it is not necessarily the case that the user 
has complete control over those files.  Just as many users do not fully 
understand how their computer data is stored, many users do not know 
when their data is deleted. 
For example, forensic analysts can often recover deleted files from 
a hard drive.  They can do that because marking a file as “deleted” 
normally does not actually delete the file; operating systems do not 
“zero out” the zeros and ones associated with that file when it is 
 
15.  Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 538 
(2005). 
16.  Id.  at 539. 
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marked for deletion.  Rather, most operating systems merely go to 
the Master File Table and mark that particular file’s clusters 
available for future use by other files.  If the operating system does 
not reuse that cluster for another file by the time the computer is 
analyzed, the file marked for deletion will remain undisturbed.  
Even if another file is assigned to that cluster, a tremendous 
amount of data often can be recovered from the hard drive’s “slack 
space,” space within a cluster left temporarily unused.  It can be 
accessed by an analyst just like any other file.17 
Just because we can keep tens of thousands of files does not mean we 
want to.  Similar to the way we clean up our homes, many of us organize, 
sort, and clean out our old documents, music, and emails from time to time.  
Interestingly, however, the intent we have to get rid of or destroy our 
electronic data is not necessarily enough to make it so.  Our files may 
remain in our possession without us even being aware of them.18  Many 
device users may incorrectly assume that if they can no longer see the file, 
then nobody else can either.  In an age where more and more of our lives 
are conducted electronically, this type of data recollection may prove 
invaluable to law enforcement as they conduct criminal investigations.  
There is arguably no other place a law enforcement officer can search 
where he has such a great opportunity to look into someone’s past the way 
he can with an individual’s computer history.  An interesting consideration 
then becomes whether this type of data recollection serves the interests of 
justice by preventing an individual from destroying what may potentially 
have been evidence of a crime, or whether this type of data recollection 
hinders justice by taking advantage of an individual’s unfamiliarity with 
advancing technology. 
B. OFF-SITE STORAGE 
Data can also be stored remotely, in the cloud.19  The cloud is a 
network of servers or, in other words, the internet.  Remote storage is 
becoming preferable because of its seemingly unlimited capacity and its 
ability to be accessed from anywhere.20  Off-site storage is often third-party 
 
17.  Id.  at 542. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Cloud computer refers to an architecture that links computers in a grid and allows users 
to access data or processing power.  Storing photos on the web or accessing webmail are two 
examples of cloud computing.  Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, 
PEW RESEARCH (June 11, 2010), www.pewinternet.org/Topics/Technology-and-Media/Cloud-
Computer.aspx?typeFilter=5. 
20.  “[Fifty-one percent] of internet users who have done a cloud computing activity say a 
major reason they do this is that it is easy and convenient.” John Horrigan, Use of Cloud 
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storage.  Rather than saving your data to your own device, you are saving 
the data to a third-party server.21  Despite its growing prevalence, it seems 
that the average electronics user understands even less about this type of 
storage than he or she may understand about on-site storage.  In fact, many 
people do not even realize they are using the cloud.  Citrix, reporting on a 
Wakefield Research poll conducted in August of 2012, announced that: 
A majority of Americans (54 percent) claim to never use cloud 
computer.  However, 95 percent of this group actually does use the 
cloud.  Specifically, 65 percent bank online, 63 percent shop 
online, 58 percent use social networking sites such as Facebook or 
Twitter, 45 percent have played online games, 29 percent store 
photos online, 22 percent store music or videos online, and 19 
percent use online file-sharing.  All of these services are cloud 
based.  Even when people don’t think they’re using the cloud, they 
really are.22 
Whether we are consciously aware of it or not, cloud-computing seems 
to be taking over.  The annual North Bridge Future of Cloud Computing 
Survey reported that seventy-five percent of companies used the cloud in 
2013.23  This figure represented an increase from the sixty-seven percent of 
companies that used the cloud in 2012.24  The cloud means that we can now 
store more information than ever before and the polls mean that more 
people are using the cloud every year, whether they know it or not.  
Whether or not they are aware of it, people who access smartphone 
applications and websites such as Netflix, Facebook, Dropbox, or Google 
Docs are using the cloud.  This type of information storage is even less 
similar to the traditional physical searches than computer hard drives were.  
It may become necessary for the legal community to reevaluate traditional 
search and seizure law in light of how our personal information is now 
commonly used and stored, while keeping in mind what the average user 
knows or does not know about the devices and data he or she is using. 
 
Computing Applications and Services, PEW RESEARCH (Sept. 12, 2008), 
www.pewinternet.org/2008/09/12/use-of-cloud-computing-applications-and-services/.  
21.  The third party server will depend on the website you are using; popular third parties 
include Google’s gmail, Apple’s iCloud, or websites, such as Facebook. 
22.  Most Americans Confused By Cloud Computing According to National Survey, CITREX 
(August 28, 2012), www.citrix.com/news/announcements/aug-2012/most-americans-confused-by-
cloud-computing-according-to-national html.   
23.  The Future of Cloud Computing 3
rd
 Annual Survey 2013, NORTH BRIDGE, 
www nbvp.com/2013-cloud-computing-survey; see also Michael J. Kok, 2013 Future of Cloud 
Computing 3
rd
 Annual Survey Results, www.mjskok.com/resource/2013-future-cloud-computing-
3rd-annual-survey-results.  
24.  See generally Kok, supra note 23. 
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III. ELECTRONIC SEARCHES & THE LAW25 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects citizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.26  It was important to the authors of the 
Fourth Amendment to include a particularity requirement in the language of 
the Fourth Amendment, which prevents law enforcement officials from 
executing general searches.  Warrants must describe specifically where, 
when, and what police officers are searching for and they are approved by a 
judge prior to execution.  This means that if the police are searching 
specifically for a large object, they may not look for it in small areas that 
would be unable to contain the larger object, because that would be 
unreasonable.27  The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment, in other words, 
is reasonableness. 
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment is a 
protection of people, not places,28 and offers protection where an individual 
has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”29  The reasonable expectation of 
privacy test asks whether the individual exhibited a subjective expectation 
of privacy with regard to the thing searched and, if so, whether that 
expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.30  Since electronic stored information is relatively new, the 
majority of case law surrounding the Fourth Amendment concerns the 
searches of homes and physical possessions.  The case law in this area 
makes sense with regards to physical searches because warrants describing 
a specific address, room, and object to be searched within a given time 
period offer the detailed particularity necessary for a citizen’s protection.  
As applied to electronically stored possessions, which store vast quantities 
of information in locations unfamiliar to law enforcement, prosecutors, and 
magistrates, these specifications may make less sense and may ultimately 
be less reasonable. 
Courts have likened an individual’s expectation of privacy in his or her 
computer to the expectation of privacy held in other closed containers.31  
Similarly, CDs32 and individual computer folders33 have been found to 
 
25.  Electronic evidence is typically governed by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and statutory laws codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2006), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 
(2006), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2006). 
26.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
27.  Id. 
28.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
29.  Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
30.  Id. at 361. 
31.  United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822-23 (1982). 
32.  See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 464-65 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that police 
may examine remaining files on a disk that had been partially, privately searched). 
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represent a closed container for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis.  
Even so, some courts have explicitly acknowledged the significant 
differences between electronic storage devices, like computers, and typical 
closed containers, such as briefcases or folders: 
The advent of the electronic age and . . . development of desktop 
computers that are able to hold the equivalent of a library’s worth 
of information, go beyond the established categories of 
constitutional doctrine.  Analogies to other physical objects, such 
as dressers or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we 
now face as judges when applying search and seizure law.34 
Remotely stored folders, however, may not be considered closed 
containers the way on-site folders are.  The Supreme Court has held that 
there is no Fourth Amendment protection where personal information is 
kept by a third party because there is no reasonable expectation to privacy 
where information is shared with or given to a third party.35  What does that 
mean in the age of cloud computing and smartphone applications?  As 
described earlier, more and more of our internet-based activities require 
using third party, cloud based storage, whether we are aware of it or not.  
How will the law resolve whether an individual maintains his or her 
reasonable expectation of privacy when the contents of his accounts are 
(and perhaps must be) stored with third party providers?36  Even if an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stored information 
held by a third party, if the third party has common authority over the 
information, it may choose to disclose it to the government itself.37 
 
33.  See People v. Emerson, 766 N.Y.S.2d 482, 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding computer 
folders rather than files are closed containers). 
34.  United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001). 
35.  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that financial records kept by 
a bank were outside the protection of the Fourth Amendment); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322 (1973) (holding that a subpoena for records provided to an accountant from a client for the 
purpose of preparing tax returns did not raise a Fourth Amendment issues); United States v. 
Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 224-26 (D.P.R. 2002) (holding there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information placed on the internet); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 
U.S. 735 (1979) (holding individuals have no expectation of privacy in dialed phone numbers).  
36.  See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904-08 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in paper messages stored by provider of 
communication services); see also Wilson v. Moreau, 440 F. Supp. 2d, 108 (D.R.I. 2006) (holding 
a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a Yahoo! email account). 
37.  See United States v. Young, 350 F.3d 1302, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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A. STATUTORY LAW:  THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S APPROACH TO 
 ELECTRONIC SEARCHES 
At the federal level, the applicable law for searching electronically 
stored information will vary depending on where the information sought is 
located.  For on-site, locally held data, law enforcement will seek a warrant 
pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.38  For  
off-site, remotely held data, varying statutory provisions, such as the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act39 (ECPA), may be controlling. 
1. On-Site 
Similar to the search of a home, Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure typically governs searches of on-site electronic data.  
This practice of treating electronic searches similar to physical searches has 
caused a debate about how the plain view doctrine40 is implicated.  As we 
know, computers hold a lot more information than the typical household 
file cabinet.  In fact, computers likely hold more information than the 
average user even knows about: 
Metadata and other artifacts left by the computer can reveal 
information about what files have recently been accessed, when a 
file was created and edited, and sometimes even how it was edited.  
Virtual memory paging systems can leave traces of information on 
the hard drive that the user might have believe was stored only in 
volatile computer memory such as RAM and expected to disappear 
when the computer was shut down.  Browsers, mail readers, chat 
clients, and other programs leave behind configuration files that 
might reveal online nicknames and passwords.  Operating systems 
and applications record additional information on the hard drive, 
such as records of Internet usage, the attachment of peripherals and 
flash drives, and the times the computer was in use.  Collectively, 
this information can reveal to an investigator not just what a 
computer happens to contain at the time of the search, but also 
evidence of who has used a computer, when, and how.41 
 
38.  Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 41.  
39.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006). 
40.  The plain view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement.  Specifically, it allows law enforcement officers to seize objects with an immediately 
apparent incriminating nature, so long as the officer is lawfully in the place from which the object 
was seen.  See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
41.  See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, Searching and Seizing Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal 
Investigations 62 (2009) (hereinafter referred to as “DOJ Manual”). 
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The sheer volume of information accessible in on-site searches has 
caused some in the legal community to wonder if the plain view doctrine, as 
applied in these circumstances, is effectively swallowing the entire warrant 
requirement.  In a computer search, however, it is unlikely that law 
enforcement officers or investigators will know exactly where they need to 
look (especially when criminals hide or encrypt files).  So what can law 
enforcement look at?  The Department of Justice (DOJ) takes the position 
that its investigators may make a cursory review of each file on the 
computer to first determine whether or not it falls within the scope of the 
search warrant.42  Oftentimes, an investigator who inadvertently discovers 
evidence of a new crime (in plain view) on the device will seek an 
additional search warrant authorizing a search for the new crime.  This may 
be a safe practice for now, but some courts remain concerned because of the 
overwhelming amount of information stored on these devices and have 
instead required officers to use taint teams43 or waive the plain view 
doctrine entirely.44 
It is worth mentioning that in 2012, North Dakota amended its criminal 
code to provide for warrant guidelines authorizing seizures of electronically 
stored information and its storage mediums.  Specifically, it provides that: 
A warrant under Rule 41(c) may authorize the seizure of electronic 
storage media or the seizure or copying of electronically stored 
information.  Unless otherwise specified, the warrant authorizes a 
later review of the media or information consistent with the 
warrant.  The time for executing the warrant refers to the seizure or 
on-site copying of the media or information, and not to any later 
off-site copying or review.45 
This language indicates an approach similar to that of the DOJ in that 
law enforcement can look first and what they find can be reviewed later.  It 
is likely that this approach implicates similar plain view doctrine concerns 
as those previously discussed. 
 
42.  “The plain view doctrine arises frequently in the search warrant context because it is 
usually necessary to review all files on a computer to find evidence that falls within the scope of a 
warrant.”  Id.  at 36; see also United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding too much evidence could escape discovery if warrants were limited to specific search 
protocol).  
43.  “A team of prosecutors . . . may form a ‘filter team’ or a ‘taint team’ to help execute the 
search . . . The filter team sets up a so-called ‘ethical wall’ between the evidence and the 
prosecution team, permitting only unprivileged files to pass over the wall.”  DOJ Manual, supra 
note 41, at 110.  
44.  “Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view 
doctrine in digital evidence cases.”  United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 
989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009). 
45.  N.D.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2)(3). 
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2. Off-Site 
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”)46 regulates the government’s 
access to stored account information from network service providers by 
providing statutory privacy rights for users of computer network service 
providers.  The SCA provides protection in relation to the importance of the 
privacy interest at stake:  “some information can be obtained from providers 
with subpoena; other information requires a special court order; and still 
other information requires a search warrant.  In addition, some types of 
legal process require notice to the subscriber, while other types do not.”47 
The rules of the SCA must be applied to the facts of each case.  Agents 
and prosecutors must classify the network provider by its service, classify 
the information sought as enumerated by the SCA, and consider whether 
they are seeking compelled or voluntary disclosure by the provider.48  If a 
prosecutor decides to seek compelled disclosure, she must determine 
whether a search warrant,49 a 2703(d) court order,50 or a subpoena is 
necessary to do so.  The differences between these methods of disclosure 
lies in what the government must show in order to gain access to the sought 
after information.  For example, if the DOJ wants to obtain something such 
as call logs, it only needs a 2703(d) court order, which only requires that the 
government show that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such 
information is relevant to an ongoing investigation.  This, in other words, is 
less than a showing of probable cause.  If, on the other hand, the DOJ is 
seeking the content of those calls, it usually needs to obtain a search 
warrant, which requires a showing of probable cause. 
 
B. CASE LAW:  ELECTRONIC SEARCHES IN THE DISTRICT OF  
 NORTH DAKOTA 
Compared to that of traditional, physical searches, there is relatively 
limited case law for electronic searches.  There is even less developed case 
law in North Dakota.  This absence should be recognized as an opportunity 
for our state to start on the right foot.  As our economy continues to grow 
and as remotely located electronic storage becomes increasingly prevalent, 
 
46.  The SCA is included in Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 
(“ECPA”) and are often referred to interchangeably.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).   
47.  DOJ Manual, supra note 41, at 116. 
48.  Id. 
49.  This search warrant would still have to comport with N.D.R.Crim.P. 41. 
50.  “[A] 2703(d) court order can compel everything that a subpoena can compel (plus 
additional information), and a search warrant can compel the production of everything that a 
2703(d) order can compel (and then some).”  DOJ Manual, supra note 41, at 127. 
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our courts will likely be presented with new legal questions about what it 
means to protect a North Dakotan’s right to be free from an unreasonable 
search.  As always, we will look to precedent when we are confronted with 
new challenges.  For this purpose, this article addresses two cases from the 
federal courts of North Dakota that offer insight on what a reasonable 
electronic search looks like at the federal level. 
1. United States v. Mutschelknaus 
In United States v. Mutschelknaus,51 Chad Allen Mutschelknaus moved 
to suppress evidence found on his computer and electronic storage media 
after he was indicted for receipt and distribution of material involving the 
sexual exploitation of a minor.52  From a computer in Mandan, North 
Dakota, Mutschelknaus sent over 200 pictures during an online 
conversation with an undercover agent.53  Two months later, the special 
agent submitted a warrant application to search the Mandan residence and 
“any computer/electronic storage media that may be seized.”54  The 
resulting warrant provided that the search be conducted by December 22, 
2007 and granted the government the right to search any authorized 
electronic device or storage media sixty days from the warrant’s 
execution.55  The agents performed the forensic analysis of Mutschelknaus’ 
computer and storage media between December 14, 2007 and February 12, 
2008.56 
Mutschelknaus moved to suppress the warrant, arguing that the special 
agent did not establish probable cause in the warrant application.  
Specifically, Mutschelknaus pointed to “the omission of the images and a 
specific description of the subjects to demonstrate that they were actually 
children,”57 and Mutschelknaus cited United States v. Syphers as 
precedent.58  In addition, Mutschelknaus moved to suppress the evidence59 
on the basis that the sixty days granted to the government for the search 
 
51.  564 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D.N.D. 2008). 
52.  Id.  at 1074. 
53.  Id.  
54.  Id.  
55.  Id.  
56.  Id.  
57.  Id. 
58.  Id.  at 1075 (citing United States v. Syphers, 426 F.3d 461, 465 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(explaining that a “court reviewing a warrant application to search for pornographic materials 
ordinarily is unable to perform the evaluation required by the Fourth Amendment if the 
application is based on allegedly pornographic images neither appended to, nor described in, the 
supporting affidavit.”)). 
59.  Id.  at 1074. 
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violated Rule 41(e)(2)(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
require warrants be executed within ten days.60 
The district court held that probable cause existed for the issuance of 
the search warrant of the Mandan residence and the electronic media 
therein.61  The court declined to require that images of child pornography, 
or detailed descriptions of the images, be included with the search warrant 
application.62  With regard to Mutschelknaus’ argument that the execution 
of the warrant illegally exceeded the ten days provided for in Rule 
41(e)(2)(A), the court quoted United States v. Hernandez, which held that 
“[n]either Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 nor the Fourth Amendment provides for a 
specific time limit in which a computer may undergo a government forensic 
examination after it has been seized pursuant to a search warrant.”63  
Ultimately finding that the sixty days authorized by the issuing magistrate 
was a reasonable time frame in which the government could search the 
electronic media devices, the court denied both of Mutschelknaus’ motions 
to suppress.64 
In 2010, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court’s 
ruling denying Mutschelknaus’ motions to suppress.  After finding that the 
warrant application contained sufficiently detailed descriptions of the 
images and after noting the investigator’s experience with child 
pornography cases, the court rejected Mutschelknaus’ argument claiming a 
lack of probable cause.65  The court then reviewed Mutschelknaus’ second 
argument, that the sixty-day extension the magistrate allowed for forensic 
analysis of the computer violated Rule 41, and wrote:  “Regardless of 
whether Rule 41 was violated . . . ‘noncompliance with Rule 41 does not 
automatically require exclusion of evidence in a federal prosecution.  
Instead, exclusion is required only if a defendant is prejudiced or if reckless 
disregard of proper procedure is evident.’”66  The court noted that 
Mutschelknaus did not argue that he was prejudiced by the sixty-day 
extension, and it reasoned that the nature of electronically stored evidence 
may cause delays.67  Finally, the court concluded that the officers did not 
act with a reckless disregard of proper procedures, and ultimately affirmed 
the district court’s rulings.68 
 
60.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(A). 
61.  Mutschelknaus, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 183 F. Supp. 2d 468, 480 (D.P.R. 2002)). 
64.  Id. at 1077. 
65.  United States v. Mutschelknaus, 592 F.3d 826, 828 (8th Cir. 2010). 
66.  Id.  at 829-30 (quoting United States v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006)). 
67.  Id.  at 830. 
68.  Id. 
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2. United States v. Cartier 
In United States v. Cartier,69 the Spanish Guardia Civil Computer 
Crime Unit (SGCCCU), working with a private company, developed a 
software program capable of searching peer-to-peer (P2P)70 computer 
networks for child pornography using hash values.71  During this process, 
the SGCCCU found that “several of the digital images known to be child 
pornography were downloaded by an ISP address associated with a 
computer in North Dakota,” and SGCCCU contacted the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations (FBI).72  Using the information provided by the SGCCCU, 
the FBI sought a warrant for Cartier’s home, where “agents seized 13 hard 
drives, two thumb drives, and hundreds of compact discs and video tapes.  
Over 1,000,000 still images of child pornography and more than 4,000 
video images of child pornography were found on the computer seized from 
Cartier’s residence.”73 
On appeal, Cartier claimed the agent failed to establish the probable 
cause necessary for the warrant since the agent relied on hash values of 
digital files that the agent did not view.74  Cartier also argued that the search 
was overly broad, the warrant did not communicate a search strategy, and 
that he was not given proper Miranda warnings.75  In arguing the lack of 
probable cause, Cartier offered an expert witness who testified that it would 
be possible for two digital files to have colliding, or overlapping, hash 
values.76  The government’s expert witness testified that “no two dissimilar 
files will have the same hash value.”77  The district court sided with the 
government’s expert, and the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals found no factual 
error in that decision.78 
In arguing that the search was overbroad, Cartier pointed to the absence 
of a search strategy, and Cartier offered that, without one, the warrant was 
 
69.  543 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 2008). 
70.  “P2P networks allow computers to share files with each other without using a central file 
server.  Instead, every computer connected to the P2P network can send and receive files because 
each computer acts as both a server and a client.  Therefore, each computer that is logged into the 
P2P network can share information and obtain information from any other computer that is part of 
the P2P network.” Id.  at 444. 
71.  Hash values act as electronic fingerprints for digital images.  Specifically, a hash value 
represents an image’s identity by a string of numbers and letters.  In this case, “the ‘hash values’ 
were unique sets of 32 numbers and letters that were calculated using a mathematical algorithm 
that considered certain data contained in individual files.”  Id.  at 444 n.3.  
72.  Id.  at 445. 
73.  Id.  
74.  Id.  
75.  Id.  
76.  Id.  at 446. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id.  
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invalid per se.79  Specifically, Cartier argued that the warrant should have 
included a strategy that would protect private files having nothing to do 
with child pornography from the search.80  This issue had not previously 
been decided in the 8th Circuit but had been rejected by other circuits.81  In 
affirming the district court’s denials of Cartier’s motions to suppress, the 
court wrote that: 
Cartier [did] not allege that he was prejudiced by any search of 
unrelated files nor [did] he allege that any unrelated files were 
actually searched . . . While we acknowledge that there may be 
times that a search methodology or strategy may be useful or 
necessary, we decline to make a blanket finding that the absence of 
a search methodology or strategy renders a search warrant invalid 
per se.  Therefore, on the facts of this case, we do not find that the 
absence of a search methodology or strategy was fatal to the 
validity of the search warrant.82 
IV. ELECTRONIC SEARCH DISCUSSIONS 
As more people begin to use laptops, smartphones, and the cloud for 
personal uses, discussions about governmental searches of these devices 
have grown in popularity.  Discussions about electronic searches are 
ongoing in the media, in academic journals, and in the courthouses.  It is 
important that North Dakota’s legal community is sensitive to these 
discussions as we continue to develop this emerging area of the law. 
A. IN THE MEDIA:  THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 
One of the most prominent debates in the media is about how the 
United States can strike an appropriate balance between intelligence 
gathering and privacy protection.  As we know, last summer it was learned 
that wireless providers were providing the government with call 
information data pursuant to the ECPA.  The President made clear, 
however, that the providers turned this information over pursuant to court 
orders.  Perhaps in part due to growing national concerns about privacy 
protection, the President remarked at his year-end press conference that the 
National Security Agency surveillance program would likely be reformed in 
 
79.  Id.  at 447. 
80.  Id.  
81.  Id.  (citing United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1108 (9th 
Cir. 2008); United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Hill, 
459 F.3d 966, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1251–52 (10th Cir. 
2005)). 
82.  Id.  at 447-48. 
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the near future.83  Members of North Dakota’s legal community should stay 
tuned to this discussion as our nation’s leaders weigh current electronic 
search and seizure law against the privacy expectations of our citizens. 
B. IN ACADEMIC JOURNALS:  RETHINKING THE PLAIN  
 VIEW DOCTRINE 
Legal scholars have been offering opinions about electronic searches 
for decades.  Likely in anticipation of future Supreme Court review, many 
law review articles have focused on the implication of the plain view 
doctrine to on-site searches.84  In particular, these articles often advocate 
that the current dragnet approach to on-site electronic searches functions 
similarly to the general warrants that the Constitution sought to prohibit.  In 
2005, Orin S. Kerr, an Associate Professor at George Washington 
University Law School, offered three possible remedies to the problems 
presented by the plain view doctrine: 
The first approach would narrow the plain view exception based 
on the circumstances of the search, such as the analyst’s subjective 
intent or the tool used.  The second approach would narrow the 
exception based on the nature of the evidence discovered, 
permitting the use of some kinds of evidence while blocking 
others.  Both of these proposals seem promising at first, but prove 
difficult to apply in practice.  The third proposal is more 
draconian:  it would abolish the plain view exception in digital 
evidence cases . . . Eliminating the plain view exception for digital 
searches is not an ideal solution, and it may not be necessary 
today.  But it may eventually prove the best way to restore the 
function of the Fourth Amendment in a world of digital 
evidence.85 
Professor Kerr acknowledged that elimination of the plain view 
doctrine might not have been quite necessary in 2005.  Perhaps elimination 
of the plain view doctrine is not necessary in 2014, either; however, the 
legal community should continue to think about what circumstances may 
render the exception unjust going forward. 
 
83.  See President Obama Holds a News Conference, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 20, 2013), 
www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2013/12/20/president-obama-holds-news-
conference.  
84.  See generally Kerr, supra note 15, at 538; see also James T. Stinsman, Computer 
Seizures and Searches:  Rethinking the Applicability of the Plain View Doctrine, 83 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1097 (2011).  
85.  Kerr, supra note 15, at 577. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, searches of electronically stored data are becoming 
increasingly important due to its increase in popularity both in the general 
public and in criminal investigations.  While many people do not recognize 
differences in electronic storage locations, the law does.  Electronic search 
issues are of significant future importance in North Dakota, where we have 
limited precedent and an opportunity to lead the way.  Lawyers in North 
Dakota should take part in the debate about the plain view doctrine’s 
implications in on-site searches.  These matters affect us not just as 
professionals in the criminal justice system, but also as citizens.  In 
addition, Congress or the courts should offer Fourth Amendment 
protections to remotely stored personal data.  While the SCA establishes a 
current standard for government search, the third-party doctrine established 
by the Supreme Court’s application to this electronic information is 
uncertain.  These typically personal communications, despite often being 
held by third parties, are deserving of the same protections they would have 
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